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Managing Knowledge Boundaries for Open Innovation - Lessons from the 
Automotive Industry  
 
Purpose: The shifting locus of innovations from the firm to the supply chain level in the 
automotive industry has led to an advanced integration of suppliers in New Product 
Development (NPD). The rising need to innovate and obtain knowledge from more distant 
knowledge sources calls for new innovation strategies and calls for a better integration of 
other external actors who lie outside the traditional automotive supply chain. Such an open 
innovation strategy challenges organizational boundaries both on the firm and supply chain 
levels, yet our understanding of the functioning of such boundaries and how they can be 
managed to allow for purposive knowledge flows is limited. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: In a longitudinal case study we trace the development of 
the first open innovation network in the German automotive industry over a period of 5 years 
based on (1) archival data, (2) semi-structured interviews, and (3) field observations. 
 
Findings: While the automotive industry is advanced in collaborating with suppliers for 
innovation, routines for assessing and integrating ideas from sources outside the supply chain 
are still underdeveloped. We show which knowledge boundaries currently exist which pose 
obstacles for open innovation initiatives in this industry and how they could be mediated 
through the involvement of gatekeepers.  
 
Originality/Value: We challenge and clarify the notion of the ‘permeability of organizational 
boundaries’ in the Open Innovation literature and investigate the role of gatekeepers for open 
innovation. As a mature industry, the automotive industry offers an excellent setting for this 
research. potential of applying an open innovation strategy in the automotive industry which 
has been a less investigated context for this strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms that pursue an open innovation strategy tend to achieve higher innovative performance 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006; Parida et al. 2012). Central to open innovation is the emphasis on a 
search for ideas and knowledge from external actors, which are brought into the firm and 
integrated into internal innovation processes (Vanhaverbeke, 2006). There is an unchallenged 
assumption in the open innovation literature that organizational boundaries (including firm, 
supply chain, and industry boundaries), become “porous” (Laursen and Salter, 2006) or even 
“fade” (Dittrich and Duysters, 2007) simply as a result of adopting this strategy. This raises 
questions of what organizational boundaries exactly are and how they can be “opened up” so 
that valuable knowledge from the outside can be identified and integrated.  
Despite its centrality in the open innovation literature, the assumption of permeable 
boundaries is taken-for-granted and yet remains ill understood. In order to elucidate this 
theoretically and managerially relevant issue, we distinguish between two kinds of 
organizational boundaries, i.e., boundaries of activities, on the one hand, and boundaries of 
knowledge, on the other. “What firms make and what they know” (Brusoni et al., 2001: 600) 
can deviate, however, and a firm’s knowledge boundaries often extend beyond boundaries of 
activities in production and other functions. How firms open up their boundaries of activities, 
by outsourcing part of production to external parties such as suppliers, competitors, and 
service firms, for example, is a well-understood phenomenon. The opening of knowledge 
boundaries is less understood, however, but deserves further investigation as the integration of 
knowledge that stems from external partners often proves to be difficult, particularly when the 
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knowledge differs from existing knowledge domains of the firm (Piezunka & Dahlander, 
2015).  
The process of opening knowledge boundaries could be particularly challenging for firms 
from mature and asset-intensive industries like automotive that have been shown to be more 
rigid in changing their internal innovation processes (Chiaroni et. al., 2011). Given the 
increasing range of automotive innovation – combining knowledge from several scientific 
disciplines such as chemistry (e.g. batteries), materials science (e.g. lightweight materials), 
and consumer electronics (e.g. infotainment) – it is becoming exceedingly difficult and costly 
for carmakers to “go deep” across all technologies (cf. Coronado Mondragon & Miller 2006; 
Kamp & Bevis 2012). The pressure to innovate and integrate new functionalities in the 
vehicle has increased carmakers’ efforts to obtain innovations from outside their traditional 
firm and supply chain boundaries and embed themselves in more or less “loosely coupled 
networks of different actors” (Laursen and Salter, 2006). Carmakers are increasingly facing 
the need to not only build relationships with traditional automotive systems or parts suppliers 
(Karlsson & Skőld 2013) – which are usually well integrated in their New Product 
Development (NPD) processes (Ragatz et al., 1997; Handfield et al., 1999; Cousins et al., 
2011; Wong et al., 2013) – but also with other external actors such as private inventors, 
engineering firms and other service providers, research institutes, and competitors to provide 
them with new knowledge for innovations.  
In order to answer the question – “How do firms manage organizational knowledge 
boundaries for open innovation,” we studied a major open innovation initiative that was 
founded in 2006 by major car manufacturers based in Germany. The insights from our 
longitudinal case study offers two contributions: First, the paper discusses for the first time in 
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the context of the burgeoning open innovation literature how the ‘permeability of 
organizational boundaries’ can actually be understood and managed. In this context, we 
highlight the role of gatekeepers that perform a mediating role in increasing the permeability 
of knowledge boundaries. Second, we provide empirical insights from the hierarchically 
structured automotive industry, a type of industry where open innovation has been less 
studiedwhere we expect knowledge boundaries to be particularly rigid and the need for the 
Open Innovation literature to better understand the way in which organizational knowledge 
boundaries work is much more evident than in other industries. We show that while this 
industry is advanced in collaborating with automotive part-suppliers for innovation, it did not 
master the challenge of assessing and integrating ideas from sources outside the traditional 
supply chain, yet.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Open Innovation in the automotive industry  
Open innovation is when a firm either actively seeks to obtain knowledge developed by other 
parties in order to incorporate it in its own innovation efforts, or provides knowledge it has 
developed itself to others for further development (West and Bogers, 2013). Inbound open 
innovation is when a firm enriches its own knowledge base by accessing external knowledge 
(e.g., through technology in-licensing or acquisition) (Chesbrough, 2003; Gassmann and 
Enkel, 2006). Commercializing innovations is often referred to as outbound open innovation 
when existing knowledge of the firm can be exploited outside firm boundaries by licensing IP 
or cross industry innovation (West and Bogers, 2013). As for many studies we focus on the 
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more prevalent inbound open innovation, as it is also more dominant in practice (West et al., 
2014).  
The automotive industry has long been characterized as a scale-intensive industry 
where the majority of innovations are created by R&D departments of a few large firms 
(Pavitt, 1984). Growing demand from consumers for lighter and fuel-efficient cars with 
reduced emissions, more active and passive safety features, driving assistance and 
infotainment equipment (BCG, 2014) make creating and financing all innovations internally 
less viable. As a result, the prevailing mindset in the automotive industry is changing, as 
actors increasingly recognize “that not all ideas and innovations must be started by their own 
capacities” (Ili et al. 2010: 249). 
Carmakers have reacted to these trends by intensifying collaboration with their first 
tier suppliers with the aim to develop new products and technologies (Helper and Sako, 2010; 
Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). More activities are either fully or partially carried out by 
established first tier suppliers such as Denso, Bosch and Valeo, and their importance in 
product development is expected to increase (BCG, 2014). The integration of suppliers in new 
product development is particularly critical in fields that lie outside traditional technological 
domains. Suppliers can be a primary source of product and process innovation in bringing 
environmental improvements to the plant (Geffen and Rothenberg, 2000) and play a critical 
role in Electric Vehicle development and assembly, as these require special capabilities 
(Ciravegna et al., 2013). There is, thus, a common understanding in the literature that buyer–
supplier cooperation is crucial for new product development processes of carmakers and 
herald the transition to open innovation strategies (Schuster & Brem, 2015).  
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Whereas the automotive industry can be considered advanced in managing boundaries 
with automotive parts suppliers, experience with integrating other external actors outside the 
industry is at a very nascent stage. This might be problematic as functional innovations 
increasingly require the integration of knowledge from distant domains that established 
suppliers do not offer, such as knowledge about psychophysiology (e.g. monitoring driver’s 
fatigue) or specific information technology applications. Integrating outside-industry 
knowledge poses particular challenges, however. In their study of three cases in the 
automotive industry on the use of open innovation, Lazzarotti et al. (2013) found knowledge 
stemming from universities was often considered “far from the market”. Even in those cases 
where a carmaker did manage to set up a successful collaboration with an outside industry 
innovator, the innovator would seldomly transition from a technology supplier to a 
component supplier with production responsibilities for series. 
 
2.2. The role of the gatekeepers for overcoming knowledge boundaries  
Open innovation often involves soliciting ideas from external contributors, which can be 
facilitated through the use of ICT. It constitutes a form of distant search, since firms will 
usually try to tap into knowledge that does not reside within their own boundaries (Piezunka 
and Dahlander, 2015). Obtaining innovations from outside implies, however, that boundaries 
between an organization and its environment are permeable for external knowledge flows. 
The permeability of boundaries is an underlying core assumption in the literature on open 
innovation, where once an organization decides to follow an open innovation strategy, a 
“purposive flow of knowledge” from outside takes place (Chesbrough, 2006: p. 1). Gassmann 
and Enkel (2004: p. 1) write, for example, that open innovation “transforms a company’s 
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solid boundaries into a semi-permeable membrane that enables innovation to move more 
easily between the external environment and the company’s internal innovation process”. 
Laursen and Salter (2006: p. 132) state that open innovation “redefines the boundary between 
the firm and its surrounding environment, making the firm more porous and embedded in 
loosely coupled networks of different actors”. Dittrich and Duysters (2007) even speak of 
firm boundaries “fading away” as firms move to networking partnerships for innovation. Yet, 
we know little about the nature of organizational boundaries and whether their permeability 
can indeed be purposefully influenced.  
In this study we are particularly interested in the process of managing boundaries of 
knowledge that occurs when firms engage in open innovation activities. In order to gain a 
better understanding about the functioning of knowledge boundaries we build on the 
framework of Carlile (2002, 2004) who distinguishes between three types of knowledge 
boundaries that represent different degrees of difficulty in sharing knowledge: (1) Information 
processing boundaries that establish a relatively shared and stable syntax. Only when sender 
and receiver have a shared syntax can they (start to) recognize knowledge as relevant and 
potentially valuable, and proceed to exchange it. (2) Interpretative boundaries emphasize the 
importance of a common meaning of the knowledge shared among actors that come from 
different domains (such as different functions in product development). Even when a common 
syntax is present interpretative differences of the same word or object can emerge between 
members of different domains. (3) Pragmatic or political boundaries are the most difficult to 
overcome and exist because actors’ different interests impede knowledge-sharing or because 
actors may simply not be aware of others in the organization being in need of certain 
knowledge. 
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When there is a lack of common knowledge to assess outside knowledge, problems of 
sharing knowledge across boundaries are to be expected. Such problems are particularly acute 
the more distant and novel the knowledge is. Actors will then ignore “what is novel as 
something that is already known or discard what is novel as irrelevant” (Carlile, 2004: 557). 
In this context, gatekeepers have been found to play a critical role (Macdonald & Williams, 
1993) and there is a need to re-examine this role in light of the recent interest in open 
innovation that advocates the importance of networking beyond organizational boundaries 
(Whelan et al., 2010; Gemünden et al., 2007). Gatekeeping is more than a mere networking 
activity, however, it requires “translating between two systems” (Allen et al. 1979, p. 703). 
Whelan et al (2010) summarize three main tasks of gatekeepers, external knowledge 
acquisition, external knowledge translation, and internal knowledge dissemination. 
Gatekeepers – such as innovation managers in our case – scan the outside world for emerging 
technological developments relevant to the work of their R&D and Technical Development 
departments. They subsequently translate this external knowledge into terms that are 
meaningful and useful to their more locally oriented colleagues. This translation function has 
been highlighted as the most important role of the gatekeeper (Allen, 1977) and does not only 
imply the framing of elements of one community’s world view in terms of the world view of 
another community but also implies evaluating and explaining the relevance and significance 
of translations to the recipient’s practice (Pawlowski & Robey; 2004). Finally, gatekeepers 
disseminate external knowledge to targeted work colleagues whom they know would be able 
to use the information they have acquired (Macdonald & Williams, 1994).  
In summation, two related research areas inform our investigation. The literature on 
organizational knowledge boundaries sensitizes us to the structural conditions that influence 
the success of open innovation strategies in the automotive industry and beyond. The 
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literature on gatekeepers provides us with an understanding of the potential mediating 
mechanism that would be useful for overcoming those structural conditions in the form of 
knowledge boundaries. In the context of our case of open innovation in the automotive 
industry, this gatekeeper role was performed by the carmakers’ innovation managers.  
 
3. Methodology 
Case studies are particularly strong for studying abstract concepts that are not directly 
observable, such as the concept of knowledge boundaries in this study. Empirically capturing 
knowledge boundaries is challenging and requires studying the context of the phenomenon as 
well as directly interacting with actors who create it (see also Carlile, 2002; 2004). Our 
ontological stance is that such boundaries only exist because of their construction through 
powerful actors who shape and reproduce such boundaries through their (discursive and 
practical) actions (Giddens, 1984). As such we follow an interpretive stance, and see 
phenomena such as knowledge transfer across organizational boundaries as socially 
constructed rather than as objective characteristics with universal application. Like all 
qualitative research, interpretative studies seek to reveal complexities, nuances, and details 
that are commonly omitted in quantitative studies.  
We follow abductive reasoning where a general theory is sought to be reconciled with the 
observation in a balanced manner. In case study research, abductive reasoning involves 
modifying the logic of the general theory in order to reconcile it with contextual 
idiosyncrasies (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). If the observation deviates from the theory (i.e., the 
‘interpretative rule’) the formulation of a new interpretative rule is desirable (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2007). This type of reasoning is in fact one of the primary reasoning tools in 
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scientific inquiry (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013) and differs from a purely inductive reasoning 
where an emergent theory is iterated with empirical data for the sake of theory-generation (see 
Eisenhardt, 1989).   
The sampling of cases should be based on theoretical reasons, such as the revelation of 
an unusual phenomenon (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 279). We selected a unique case of 
an open innovation initiative in the German automotive industry that is embedded in a wider, 
project-based network, the “Automotive Innovation Network” (AIN). With over 60 official 
member firms (and a much larger number of companies active in the different projects and 
initiatives) the AIN has a large coverage of the German automotive industry with 
manufacturers like Porsche, BMW, and Daimler being active, as well as their first-tier 
suppliers, engineering service firms, consultants, and research institutes. The AIN has a more 
informal character and differs from consortia like SEMATECH in the U.S semiconductor 
industry (e.g. Spencer and Grindley, 1993; Browning et al., 1995), however, as it did not 
pursue an overall joint aim (e.g. develop semiconductor manufacturing technology), it was 
not financially subsidized by the government or the member firms, and there was no formal 
leadership.   
3.1. Data collection 
Our involvement with the open innovation initiative began in late-2006 and extended over 
five years. We used three main data sources: (1) archival data, (2) semi-structured interviews, 
and (3) field observations. We collected all relevant information from key members of the 
initiative and their interactions, and attended the specific project meetings and the AIN’s 
annual two-day automobile summit.  
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(1) Archival data. We were granted access to the complete email correspondence of one 
of the core members of the open innovation initiative, an innovation manager from one of the 
car manufacturers (coded as CAR4). The data contained over 1,500 emails with other 
members. These emails included recipients’ lists and, in most cases, the whole conversation 
history as well as attachments such as meeting minutes, strategy papers, and presentations. 
We complemented this data by a comprehensive analysis of additional documents that were 
provided to us by the network manager and other network members.  
(2) Interviews. We conducted telephone interviews with key actors of the open 
innovation initiative at two stages. In case of the five carmaker representatives that we 
interviewed this would be the innovation manager. All interviewed innovation managers have 
an engineering background but rather than being specialist in one field, they possess 
knowledge of a broad set of fields. All but one of them had a middle management position 
and more than 5 years of affiliation with the respective company, fitting the typical profile for 
a gatekeeper (Whelan et al., 2010). Additional interviews with innovation managers of two 
carmakers were conducted in 2016 to clarify some final questions that evolved during the 
revision process of this paper. Table 1 provides information about the interviews with core 
actors. A semi-structured instrument guided the interviews, ensuring that all topics of interest 
were covered. The interview protocol can be obtained from the authors on request. Depending 
on the background and position of a particular interviewee in the network we asked for the 
evolution of the open innovation initiative over time, open innovation practices, the 
involvement of particular actors in projects, and perceived outcomes.  
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
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A further 24 interviews, conducted between 2009 and 2011, with members from other 
working groups of the AIN as well as with innovation experts from consultancy companies, 
industry associations and regional development initiatives, and managers from other networks 
in the automotive industry provided important background information. The interviews 
typically lasted 60 minutes, and were taped and transcribed afterwards. Informal talks with 
experts, as well as with key informants from the open innovation group helped us to increase 
the validity of our data. 
(3) Field observations. From the initial stage of the founding of AIN we were included 
in the general mailing list and received invitations for all meetings. Meetings attended (for an 
overview see Table 2) were documented by our team and field notes were written-up within 
24 hours of the meetings.  
[Insert Table 2 about here]  
 
3.2. Data Analysis 
When following a data analysis approach that can best be described as the disciplined 
iteration between general theory and the empirical data (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). We started 
open coding of the interviews by labeling key words, (sub)sentences, or paragraphs with 
codes and grouped them into internally consistent categories, in a largely inductive manner. 
Often we used a word or short phrase taken from the data as a code (in-vivo). This step was 
followed by axial coding to generate more abstract codes, delete and merge codes. During this 
stage, we started to connect our open codes to established constructs from our theoretical 
framework, such as the establishment of a shared syntax, diverging meanings, and the not-
invented-here syndrome, in line with our aim of theory extension. Axial coding allowed us to 
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root our data analysis in theory and helped to refine our concepts, leading to better reliability 
of the data. Table 3 provides insights into how the different coding categories were 
developed. The coding was done separately by both authors. Deviating interpretations, 
unclear codes, and ambiguities were discussed in several rounds and, as a result of these 
discussions, a high degree of consensus, could be achieved. In order to further validate our 
interpretations, we presented and discussed our findings with the members of the open 
innovation working group at two different points of time (2008 and 2012).  
[Insert Table 3 about here]  
Our methods also permitted some within-method and between-methods triangulation. 
We could compare the data obtained from interviews with the data available from documents 
and our observations. This way we could check for any inconsistencies that we could clarify 
with our interview partners in the last round of interviews in 2011.  
 
4. Managing Knowledge Boundaries for Open Innovation 
The open innovation group within the AIN was founded out of the growing recognition of 
carmakers that new technological impulses are less likely to stem from the traditional 
boundaries of the automotive supply chain:  
“If the innovation is from our suppliers, I will get it anyway at some point. I have yearly meetings with 
Bosch, Siemens and so on. (…). They don’t need to tell me here what is new because long before it 
becomes public they have already told me.” (meeting minutes, Innovation Manager CAR3) 
As a consequence, the innovation competition they set up was thus mainly targeting small and 
medium sized companies that were believed to be more promising sources of novel 
innovative ideas and technologies than the well-known automotive parts suppliers. In 
Formatted: Indent: Before:  1.27
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particular, start-ups, entrepreneurs, and the “ingenious amateur inventor” who was 
“somewhere out there” was much trumpeted.  
4.1. Managing information processing boundaries  
One of the obstacles for open innovation in the automotive industry was that information 
processing boundaries were not sufficiently permeable for ideas from small inventors. 
Particular challenges that private inventors and start-ups were facing was that they were 
struggling to find the right contact person within the carmaker’s organization, as a project-
based working style in the Technical Development function often led to a strong thematic 
focus.  
Moreover, another information processing barrier was that communication channels only 
existed between carmakers and established suppliers and identifying the right contact person 
within the Technical Development function that could comprise up to 10,000 employees was 
difficult for outside innovators. As a result, communication about what an outside innovator 
had to offer, on the one hand, and what a car manufacturer was in need of (now or in the 
future), on the other, was thus unlikely. Moreover, even if inventors managed to get in touch 
with the right department, they were often unable to present their ideas to the OEM in an 
attractive way:  
“The problem is that a company like Bosch has thousands of engineers working in a very systematic, 
organized, and scientific manner on solutions for the future. (…) The situation is different in the case 
of small inventors because they don’t have a clue what is happening at the OEM and what the OEM is 
really in need of - even if they have a good idea they can’t validate it and present it in a manner to get 
the interest of the OEM. (…) If someone sends me a 40-pages patent description, I have to be willing 
to read through (it).” (interview, Innovation Manager CAR3) 
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A major issue was that private inventors often missed the chance to file a patent for their idea, 
which often led to the unwillingness of the innovation manager to even read the idea 
description:  
“There is a legal problem with innovations that are not patented, yet. If intellectual property of 
someone else ends up my desk and I am willing to take a closer look at it, I can never be sure if legal 
liabilities occur. ” (Interview, Innovation Manager CAR4) 
Thus, the difficulty of accessing the right contact person in the Technical Development 
function, and the preference for innovations that were already tested and verified for series 
production, presented in an attractive format, made it difficult for external knowledge to 
permeate information processing boundaries.  
In order to overcome this problem, the newly set-up innovation competition was 
targeting existing ideas that were used in industries such as medical, pharmaceutical, health, 
telecommunications, entertainment, aviation and aerospace. The competition officially started 
on January 25, 2007 with a broad search scope and related routines for members and 
submitters: anybody could submit a “product, solution or prototype that is already in use in 
other industries” that had “a substantial transfer potential for the automotive industry, or could 
create a substantial added value for the end customer, or could change the use of the vehicle 
(e.g. energy saving)” (AIN-website, 2007). Submitters were strongly encouraged to file for a 
patent or trademark to enable the open sharing of their ideas. In order to facilitate a reader-
friendly presentation a standardized submission format was designed which required a short 
description of the innovation, its maturity level and previous use, a picture or drawing, and an 
explanation of potential automotive use, restricted to two-pages in total. A jury of 20 
innovation experts with representatives from most major German OEMs, as well as from 
suppliers, other firms and institutions evaluated the 150 submissions in the first year. After 
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some internal discussions, the jury agreed on using simple and general evaluation criteria 
(consumer value, breadth of applicability in the vehicle, maturity of the innovation in its 
current field of application, expected product life duration of the innovation, sustainability, 
Customer acceptance) instead of more specific ones to allow for more openness for radical 
and unconventional ideas.  
No monetary incentives were given but the best 30 innovative ideas were presented to 
the public at an “Innovation Vernissage” at the annual automobile summit where AIN 
members and other representatives of the German automotive industry meet. Thus, the open 
competition with a standardized submission format, the need to file for a patent prior to 
submission, the use of general evaluation criteria, and the direct interaction opportunities with 
inventors at the event helped the innovation managers of the carmakers to identify promising 
ideas and follow-up on them after the competition. It can thus be said that innovation 
managers of the five carmakers which were active in the initial stage of the innovation 
competition performed their gatekeeping role in terms of information acquisition.  
4.3. Managing interpretative boundaries 
Even though gatekeepers were successful in helping to overcome information processing 
boundaries, interpretative boundaries persisted as private inventors and carmakers often used 
the same terminology but attached different meanings to them:  
“Oftentimes inventors and carmakers speak different languages. This becomes clear looking at their 
choice of names and terms. Oftentimes they carry a different meaning at the customer organization!” 
(Meeting Minutes, Innovation Manager, CAR3) 
An additional obstacle for knowledge-transfer across boundaries was that jurors – despite 
their broad technical expertise – had difficulties evaluating each submission as they were not 
technically familiar with each innovation submitted. Some, such as the innovation manager 
Formatted: Indent: First line:  0 cm
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from CAR4, actively asked firm-internal experts from different technical development 
departments for their assessments when they lacked technical competence, as the internal 
email correspondence revealed. This is an initial indication that some of the innovation 
managers did not have the necessary expertise to perform the translation function of the 
gatekeeping role themselves. The lack of a translation of external knowledge that was often 
passed on internally in “raw” form was particularly problematic as the innovation manager in 
question often found it hard to identify the right contact person. Often there was no fit 
between the internal functional organization and the technologies described in the submission. 
This made it even more questionable if external knowledge was meaningfully interpreted 
within the firm and the evaluation was actually performed well.  
It can be expected that the other innovation managers encountered similar problems 
within their firms as the overall evaluation results of the jury were anything but consistent: 
“Looking at the individual evaluations of the submissions I recognize a huge variance that might lead 
to the outcome that some of the ideas score lower in the overall rating. This variance might distort the 
actual potential of an idea.” (email from Innovation Manager CAR5)  
Moreover, despite the official claim to search for new and “disruptive” ideas, the evaluations 
were clearly biased towards already established ideas, which obtained the highest scores. The 
equal ranking of all five items of the evaluation criteria enhanced this effect (see Table A1 in 
the Appendix):  
“Concerning the process of the evaluation of submissions it is striking that the oldest ideas, that are 
already known and discussed in the automotive industry, get the highest scores. This is of little 
surprise but the question remains how we can filter out the more subtle ideas that can promise new 
ways of consumer satisfaction.” (meeting Minutes, Innovation Manager CAR1) 
As most jurors experienced the inflow of diverse ideas in the first year of the competition as 
overwhelming, the carmakers decided to more strongly target new knowledge from within the 
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automotive industry and formulate theme clusters. The new themes more conventionally 
represent the current innovation focus of the automotive industry, which are “health and 
wellness” (including ergonomics, driving assistance, registration of physiological values such 
as driver’s tiredness), “navigation and infotainment” (including precise navigations for 
accident prevention), and “CO2 reduction and lightweight construction.” The clustering in the 
call for submissions, however, caused specific problems.  
“In the first year, we were rather broadly looking for innovations from other industries. Then we got 
this colorful mix of innovations. But the jury just couldn’t handle this diversity (…) This is why we 
came up with the theme clusters in the following years. But then we ended up in the automotive 
sector again! And it is of no use for us if an automotive supplier like SKF submits their idea because 
someone from my company is very likely to already know it!” (interview, Innovation Manager 
CAR3) 
This problem was further enhanced in the following year when the carmakers decided to 
introduce an additional cluster on “efficient and flexible production,” that led to an almost 
doubling of the number of submissions, but did not generate the type of knowledge that 
carmakers were actually looking for:   
“The innovation competition did grow well but we did not really manage to find real ideas for better 
products. If someone has an idea for improving production processes then they are usually positioned in 
the industry already and have their contact person.” (email from Innovation Manager CAR4) 
 
In fact, cluster 3 and 4 (“CO2 reduction and lightweight construction” and “efficient and 
flexible production”) attracted the largest number of submissions. Thus, the introduction of 
clusters in the innovation competition was successful in raising the quantity, but less so in 
inviting the “right” type of submissions. It thus seems that interpretative boundaries were not 
overcome by the innovation managers who were not able to perform the “translation” task of 
their gatekeeper role. As a consequence, rather than seeking direct interaction with outside 
industry actors to establish a common meaning, carmakers redirected their search efforts back 
to the familiar knowledge domains of the automotive industry.  
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4.4. Managing political boundaries 
Political boundaries are the most persisting element of knowledge boundaries, which was also 
reflected in our case. The internal organization of the carmakers’ Technical Development 
departments, with a high degree of specialization around traditional technological domains 
such as platform, chassis, drivetrain, electric did not facilitate the adaption of novel ideas:  
“Most innovation themes are determined by our R&D departments. Through the innovation 
competition we sometimes deliver impulses into the company (…). However, it is hard to find a port 
for these topics in the company because the organizational structure of our product development does 
not cover them.” (interview with Innovation Manager, CAR4) 
Oftentimes the Technical Development was working on their own, alternative technology and 
was not interested in the specific submission.  
“One needs to understand that people in Technical Development are usually working in a channeled 
way based on predefined technological roadmaps. They are working on a technical task in a highly 
structured way, with clear milestones and targets. If something new comes along that is completely 
off-track, things are always difficult. They have limited interest to deal with new subjects.” 
(interview, Innovation Manager CAR3)  
Interviews with the other carmakers revealed a similar picture:  
“Whether an innovation is followed up or not is a top-level decision. But before this happens you 
need to convince an engineer who is willing to go to his boss and tells him that this is a great idea. 
Top level managers will often not be familiar with the technical details – their job is to make 
decisions, but you need to convince the engineers first.” (interview, Innovation Manager CAR1) 
Thus even though all interviewed innovation managers were active in their gatekeeper role to 
disseminate promising ideas to their internal networks within Technical Development 
departments, it was hard to actually convince their colleagues to follow up on these ideas. 
One way to help stress the innovative potential of the new knowledge against their own 
Technical Development function was, however, the reference to the discussions the 
innovation managers of the carmakers had with each other:  
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“If you can take this impulse to your own firm and discuss it with the department in charge to say: ‘Look, 
this is a new trend; we should start investing here.’ And if you can also state that this is a trend your 
competitors are also looking into, then you have a strong argument that this might really be a hot topic.” 
(interview, Innovation Manager CAR5) 
Despite their reference to competitors the innovation managers were not able to overcome 
political boundaries within their firms. After six subsequent years of conducting the 
innovation competition, with no innovation idea that actually materialized in a vehicle, the 
carmaker representatives in 2012 jointly decided to stop their engagement in the innovation 
competition.   
 
5. Discussion   
By setting up an open innovation competition with a broad search scope that targeted ‘distant’ 
knowledge sources outside the existing automotive supply chain, the members of the open 
innovation initiative set up by carmakers in Germany tried to reach into unfamiliar knowledge 
domains. Our study demonstrates the difficulties of integrating external actors outside the 
automobile supply chain and the distant knowledge that they bring into carmakers’ innovation 
processes. The car manufacturers aimed to have a truly open innovation process (Ili et al., 
2010), but found that unacknowledged boundaries to absorbing and using foreign knowledge 
can frustrate this objective. In this paper we provide more insight into how such knowledge 
boundaries function, but also into how gatekeepers such as the innovation managers of 
different carmakers active in the open innovation initiative straddle these organizational 
knowledge boundaries. We summarize our main findings with three working propositions that 
specify the different roles of gatekeepers when they (potentially) mediate between the 
structural conditions of knowledge boundaries, and the structural consequences in terms of an 
increased permeability of knowledge boundaries in an open innovation context. The rendering 
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of structural conditions and action in a reciprocal relationship is based in a perspective which 
conceives of social structure and human agency as interdependent constructs (Giddens, 1984). 
Our case study showed that information processing existed at the different carmakers’ 
organizations as prior to the innovation competition, outside-industry actors often chose the 
‘wrong presentation format’ when they submitted their ideas – often in a non-patented form –  
and did not use the right terminology that was requested by the carmakers. We, thus, propose:  
Proposition 1: When gatekeepers fulfill their external knowledge acquisition role, for 
example, by inviting only patented ideas, submitted in a standardized format, a common 
syntax between actors within and outside the organization is created and permeability of 
information processing boundaries increases.  
While the innovation managers turned out to be successful in performing their 
knowledge acquisition tasks and establishing a common syntax, a common meaning still 
needs to be established between inside and outside industry actors. Our case showed, 
however, that innovation managers often had to involve colleagues from different 
departments to evaluate ideas submitted to the innovation competition as they lacked the 
ability to transfer external information into terms that “are meaningful and useful to their 
more locally oriented colleagues” (Tushman & Katz, 1980: 47). Translation does not only 
imply the framing of elements of one community’s world view in terms of the world view of 
another community, but also implies evaluating and explaining the relevance and significance 
of translations to the recipient’s practice (Pawlowski & Robey, 2004). Thus, we propose:  
Proposition 2: Despite the presence of a common syntax, outside knowledge is not 
meaningfully interpreted when gatekeepers fail to fulfill their external knowledge translation 
role, resulting in the impermeability of interpretative boundaries.  
Formatted: Indent: First line:  0.9
cm
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Because ideas that won in the innovation competition often remained untranslated, they 
were frequently rejected by Technical Development departments. If knowledge is not 
adequately translated and transformed, no shared interest between actors outside and inside 
the (carmaker’s) organization will develop. We uncover an important cause of the not-
invented-here syndrome which is a main obstacle to successful implementation of open 
innovation (cf. Chesbrough, 2003; West and Bogers, 2013). A not-invented-here mentality in 
an organization need, however, not be purely ‘political,’ but can be a guise for a translation 
problem. In retrospect, the fact that the only official representatives from the carmakers’ side 
were innovation managers could have constituted a specific problem of the innovation 
competition, as innovation managers were lacking the necessary depth of technical expertise 
to adequately translate foreign knowledge for internal decision-makers. This might also 
explain why it was so hard for the innovation managers to overcome political boundaries, 
even though they tried to increase the external legitimacy of new technologies by referring to 
the discussions with other carmakers:  
Proposition 3: Once interpretative boundaries remain intact, political boundaries are 
likely to remain impermeable too, even if gatekeepers managed to build up external 
legitimacy for new knowledge.   
Building on the insights of our case, our study makes three main contributions: First, we 
challenge the vague, but largely taken for granted notion of ‘permeable’ organizational 
boundaries in the open innovation literature (Gassmann and Enkel, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 
2006; Dittrich and Duysters, 2007) by introducing the concept of “knowledge boundaries” 
(Carlile 2002, 2004; Brusoni et al., 2011). Second, we show that such boundaries could 
potentially be managed through the involvement of gatekeepers (Whelan et al., 2010; 
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Gemünden et al., 2007). More specifically, we offer a more nuanced understanding of 
gatekeepers in an open innovation setting and how the different roles they perform are linked 
to the permeability of knowledge boundaries. Even though gatekeepers are often mentioned in 
passing in the open innovation literature, the different roles they might play have not been 
investigated in a more systematic manner (see also Trott & Hartmann, 2009), or have only 
been advocated in more practitioner-oriented outlets (Whelan et al., 2011). Third, our 
involvement with the first open innovation initiative in the German automotive industry 
offered a unique chance to study the idiosyncrasies of thisthe particular challenges this 
industry contextis facing when transitioning to an open innovation context. Only fewEven 
though some cases of open innovation in the automotive industry have been studied so far 
(e.g. Chiaroni et. al., 2011; Lazzarotti et al., 2013) – most likely due to the scarcity of 
empirical evidence and access problemsmost studies have focused on the integration of 
traditional industry actors such as system suppliers or Full Service Vehicle suppliers (e.g. 
Karlsson and Sköld, 2013; Coronado Mondragon et al., 2006). To the best of our knowledge, 
the AIN constituted the biggest open innovation initiative involving not just one, but multiple 
major carmakers. In contrast to previous findings in other industries that highlight the “not-
invented-here” syndrome (i.e., political boundaries) as the main obstacle to open innovation 
(e.g., Laursen and Salter, 2006; West and Bogers, 2013; Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006), we 
found that it is particularly knowledge interpretation boundaries that are specifically hard to 
manage in this industry context. Interpretation boundaries result from the high degree of 
knowledge specialization that go in line with detailed specifications, and lengthy development 
cycles for automotive. ThusHowever, while the automotive industry can be considered 
advanced with respect to integrating knowledge from external suppliers (Ragatz et al., 1997; 
Handfield et al., 1999; Cousins et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2013), the very same practices for 
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managing knowledge boundaries with suppliers make it difficult to change the industry’s 
innovation model from a centralized and hierarchical one where large OEMs and their major 
suppliers collaborate, to a more decentralized one where OEMs serve as integrators that 
collaborate with large and small suppliers, private inventors, startups, engineering and design 
communities. In contrast to previous findings in other industries that highlight the “not-
invented-here” syndrome (i.e., political boundaries) as the main obstacle to open innovation 
(e.g., Laursen and Salter, 2006; West and Bogers, 2013; Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006), we 
found that it is particularly knowledge interpretation boundaries that are specifically hard to 
manage in this context. Interpretation boundaries result from the high degree of knowledge 
specialization that go in line with detailed specifications, and lengthy development cycles for 
automotive. By this, we also connect to more recent discussions on ‘complex organizational 
boundaries’ (Lakhani et al., 2012) where firms simultaneously pursue a range of boundary 
options that include “closed” vertical integration, strategic alliances with key suppliers, and 
“open” boundaries and open innovation. Our study thus made a first attempt to grasp the real-
life complexity of organizational boundaries, and question the unrealistic assumption of 
boundaries becoming equally ‘permeable’ to all external actors. By this, we also connect to 
more recent discussions on ‘complex organizational boundaries’ (Lakhani et al., 2012) where 
firms simultaneously pursue a range of boundary options that include “closed” vertical 
integration, strategic alliances with key suppliers, and “open” boundaries and open 
innovation. 
 
 6. Managerial Implications 
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As our study highlights the difficulties and challenges of an open innovation strategy in 
general, and in the context of the automotive industry in particular, it also holds some 
valuable lessons for managers in this industry. First, it has been found that it is above all 
interpretative (and only resulting from that, political boundaries), which leads to problems of 
competently evaluating distant knowledge. One approach to overcome this shortcoming 
would be to create more interaction opportunities between carmaker representatives and 
inventors before or shortly after they submit their ideas. The lack of networking opportunities 
before the actual submission deadline could be seen as a general problem of this innovation 
competition, as it is also conceivable that inventors could benefit from active interaction with 
each other, as it is often good-practice in online web communities and idea competitions. 
Recent research on the supply side of the ideation process suggests that idea creators have an 
increased need for support in the idea elaboration stage. After an idea is generated it needs to 
be further refined and developed through constructive feedback and suggestions to help 
ideators identify ways to improve and expand their ideas (Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 2015). 
Gatekeepers play again a crucial role here and can also help reduce emotional uncertainties 
that ideators might face (ibid.).  
Moreover, involving technical expertise from Technical Development departments as more 
active members of the jury could also help to solve the translation problem. It has been argued 
that the gatekeeper role recently underwent a division of labor (Whelan et al., 2010) and 
separate specialists are needed to in tandem to perform these tasks. Thus, instead of involving 
single innovation managers as a representative from the carmaker’s side, a team with more 
specialized, but complementary technical expertise could be assigned to participate in an open 
innovation initiative. As team members would also have direct, and ideally, non-overlapping 
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reporting lines to internal decision-makers, this would also have a positive influence on 
political boundaries.  
Finally, current partners with whom carmakers already collaborate, such as engineering 
services and suppliers, can serve as intermediaries possessing specific knowledge and 
experience that can make it easier for them to recognize, develop and apply foreign 
knowledge brought in through an open innovation competition. Suppliers, in particular, own 
component-specific knowledge, which might make it easier for them to recognize the 
application potential of ideas. Suppliers also possess the necessary experience and resources 
for testing and prototyping that private inventors and small entrepreneurs were lacking. Due 
to their long collaboration history, suppliers are also more familiar with the terminologies 
used at the carmaker’s organization, alleviating the translation problem.  
 
7. Conclusion and Limitations 
For managers as well as for researchers our study suggests that the perception of distance 
between the knowledge domains of the players involved in knowledge exchange can be 
altered (to some degree). Allowing distant foreign knowledge to enter an organization and be 
successfully used requires that the outside knowledge is actively connected to what inside 
knowledge is available inside an organization. While we offer insights into how knowledge or 
interpretation boundaries work, and formulate suggestions on how they can be better managed 
in the open innovation process to increase their permeability, our study has some limitations: 
First, we were not able to “objectively” assess the quality of the submissions for the 
innovation process. Over the years, however, the number of ideas submitted increased 
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substantially as the competition became better known. Carmakers in Germany have a strong 
reputation for quality and fairness in dealing with firms they collaborate with and outside 
parties would be highly motivated to participate (cf. Boudreau et al. 2011). A share of the 
ideas submitted through the competition will have had the potential to be further developed 
into useful contributions for carmakers. The likelihood that potentially valuable knowledge 
was actually not recognized is non-negligible.  
This sheds light on another, related limitation that we were not able to collect data on the 
supply side of the innovation competition and conduct interviews with the inventors 
themselves – a limitation we acknowledge explicitly, but one that is related to the focus of our 
study. This would have offered a more complete picture in terms of how inventors could have 
been better supported in the ideation process (e.g. Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 2015) in order to 
reduce knowledge boundaries also from the supply side. .  
Furthermore, despite the excellent access we had to all major carmakers who were 
involved in this initiative and the necessary documents, collecting in-depth data for each of 
the participating firms’ internal innovation processes was not feasible. A more systematic 
investigation of routines for searching and evaluating novel knowledge that are already in 
place in the firm, and how they changed, disappeared, or persisted when a new open 
innovation strategy is introduced constitutes a compelling avenue for further research. A 
better insight into firm-internal processes would have also provided us with a more nuanced 
understanding of political boundaries. This also opens the ground for further studies that 
explore how internal R&D structures could best be aligned with the search for external 
knowledge (Ihl et al., 2012) to increase the success of open innovation strategies.  
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Tables 
 
Company Interview 
partner 
Interview partner’s 
hierarchical position  
Years in 
company 
Year 
 2009 2011 2016 
CAR1 Innovation 
Manager 
Head of “Innovation 
Team”  
> 20  X X X 
CAR2 Innovation 
Manager 
Team leader 
“Innovation 
Management” 
> 5 X X  
CAR3 Innovation 
Manager 
Director “Research & 
Operations” (European 
R&D Center),  
> 20  X X X 
CAR4 Innovation 
Manager 
Senior Manager 
“Advanced Technology 
and Research” 
> 10 X  X  
CAR5 Innovation 
Manager 
Team leader 
“Technology Planning”   
> 5   X  
 
Table 1: Interviews with core jury members of the innovation competition 
 
 
 
Type of meeting Meetings attended (#) 
Kickoff-meeting (AIN) 2007 
Annual automobile summit 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 
Project meeting (Open Innovation working group) 2008 (2) 
General network meeting (AIN) 2008, 2009, 2010 
Table 2: Meetings attended 
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Managing 
knowledge 
boundaries 
Empirical 
evidence  
Interpretation Representative quotes 
Information 
processing boundaries  
Definition: Incidents 
where respondents 
describe the 
uncontrolled inflow of 
ideas and the lack of a 
shared syntax between 
inside and outside 
industry actors, and 
attempts to deal with 
this.   
 
Example codes: shared 
syntax, standardized 
presentation, 
information overflow, 
knowledge acquisition  
• Requirement to 
present new ideas 
as a prototype with 
feasibility studies 
and extensive 
testing.  
• “Unattractive” 
presentation of 
ideas, often only in 
form of patent 
description. 
 
Structural conditions 
• Ideas from external 
sources outside the 
automotive supply 
chain often had the 
“wrong presentation 
format” and the lack of 
knowledge about the 
needs of the carmakers.  
“Each week unsolicited ideas pile up on my 
desk ….I am not saying that there could be no 
idea of value among them but it would require 
a lot of goodwill and effort to filter them out.” 
(interview with Innovation Manager, CAR1) 
 
“(…) small inventors (…) don’t have a clue 
what is happening at the OEM and what the 
OEM is really in need of - even if they have a 
good idea they can’t validate it and present it 
in a manner to get the interest of the OEM. (…) 
If someone sends me a 40-pages patent 
description, I have to be willing to read 
through (it).” (interview with Innovation 
Manager, CAR3) 
• Online 
submission system 
enables innovation 
manager to access 
wider pool of ideas. 
• Prescription of a 
standardized 
submission format. 
• Standardized and 
general evaluation 
criteria. 
 
Structural consequences 
• The standardized 
presentation format 
helped to reduce 
information processing 
boundaries.  
“There as a clear presentation of the ideas on 
which we could apply ranking system. This 
allowed us to discuss the top 70 ideas one by 
one and make sense of them.” (interview with 
Innovation Manager, CAR2) 
 
“The standardized submissions format 
definitely helped to get a quick and good 
impression of the ideas. Sometimes I felt that 
more descriptions would have been necessary 
for me to be able to really evaluate an idea 
though….” (email of a jury member) 
Interpretative 
boundaries 
Definition: Incidents 
where respondents 
emphasize the lack of a 
common meaning of 
the knowledge shared 
among actors from 
within and outside the 
industry and attempts to 
deal with this.  
Example codes: 
common/different 
understanding, 
‘exoticsm’, translation, 
familiar players 
• Inventors often 
do not use the 
“right” language 
and terminology.  
Structural conditions 
• Non-familiarity with 
the right language 
creates interpretative 
boundaries between 
inside and outside 
industry actors.  
“Private inventors are often not familiar with 
the terminology that we are using in our 
company….Actually, they might be using the 
same words but they have no idea that these 
words are used differently here…” (meeting 
minutes, Innovation Manager CAR2)  
 
“Oftentimes inventors and carmakers speak 
different languages. This becomes clear 
looking at their choice of names and terms. 
Oftentimes they carry a different meaning at 
the customer organization!” (meeting minutes, 
Innovation Manager CAR3) 
• Innovation 
managers pass on 
knowledge in ‘raw 
form’  
• Use of predefined 
clusters to reduce 
interpretative 
differences with 
outside automotive 
domains. 
Structural 
consequences 
• Outside knowledge is 
not adequately 
translated and 
relevance for potential 
users remains unclear.  
• Clustering reduces 
interpretation 
boundaries but leads to 
the inflow of less novel 
knowledge.  
“My job requires that I have a broad technical 
expertise. I don’t know the in-depth details of 
all technical innovations presented here and in 
order to make a plausibility check I have to ask 
my colleagues.” (Interview with Innovation 
Manager CAR5) 
 
“My concern at the moment is that we are 
getting less consumer related innovations but 
production process related ones – see cluster 1 
and 2 compared to cluster 3 and 4. The 
principal question for me is, however, whether 
we want to have a product or production 
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innovation competition.” (email from 
Innovation Manager, CAR1) 
Political boundaries 
 
Definition: Incidents 
where respondents 
describe firm-internal 
reasons for rejecting an 
innovative idea from 
outside and attempts to 
deal with this.  
Example codes: firm-
specific 
strategies/technologies, 
organizational 
structure, knowledge 
dissemination, ‘right’ 
contact person, external 
legitimacy  
• Organizational 
structure of the 
internal Technical 
Development 
departments makes 
it difficult to find 
the right recipient. 
• Internal 
Technical 
Development 
departments were 
often working on 
alternative 
technologies. 
 
Structural conditions 
• Highly specialized 
departments that are 
structured around 
traditional automotive 
technologies create 
political boundaries.  
“The structure of the Technical Development 
function is rather conventional which makes it 
often hard for me to find the right port for a 
winning idea.” (interview, Innovation Manager 
CAR5) 
 
“All innovation decisions in our company are 
made at the board level. So an engineer would 
need to be really enthusiastic about an idea so 
that he will go to his boss, and his boss with go 
to his boss to say: ‘This is a great idea, we 
really need it!’ So the idea must be incredibly 
good to convince someone to follow this path.”  
(interview, Innovation manager CAR1) 
  
• Innovations 
managers of 
different carmakers 
discuss novel 
technologies to 
reduce the 
uncertainties and 
can create external 
legitimacy.  
Structural 
consequences 
• External legitimacy is 
not sufficient to reduce 
political boundaries. 
“We identify trends that matter for our core 
business and we provide impulses for our 
company. Based on our activities, I might 
prepare a presentation for our board of 
directors. And if I can refer to the discussion 
we had at the Innovation roundtable I have a 
much stronger case internally to say: Look this 
could be interesting. The other carmakers are 
also thinking about it.”  
(Innovation manager CAR1) 
 
“…all the time we were always looking for the 
ingenious amateur inventor from the Black 
Forest. We know now: this amateur inventor 
does not exist, at least not for the Automotive 
industry.” (interview, Innovation Manager 
CAR1) 
Table 3: Central coding categories and representative quotes 
 
 
 
